Hard, Soft & Uncertain: The Guarani Aquifer and the Challenges of Transboundary Groundwater by Cassuto, David N
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
Winter 2013
Hard, Soft & Uncertain: The Guarani Aquifer and
the Challenges of Transboundary Groundwater
David N. Cassuto
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, dcassuto@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Natural
Resources Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
David N. Cassuto & Romulo S.R. Sampaio, Hard, Soft & Uncertain: The Guarani Aquifer and the Challenges of Transboundary
Groundwater, 24 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L & Pol’y 1 (2013), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/868/.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212168
Articles 
 
Hard, Soft & Uncertain:            
The Guarani Aquifer and the 








This Article begins with an overview of the ecology of the Guarani 
Aquifer region before turning to the legal and ecological problems it 
faces. Because the majority of the Guarani Aquifer underlies Brazil (with 
the rest residing below Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), the laws and 
policies of Brazil have a significant managerial impact. Consequently, 
the Brazilian legal regime forms the focus of the first Part of the Article. 
The Article then analyzes the international transboundary framework 
before turning to the recently enacted Agreement on the Guarani 
Aquifer. This Agreement, signed but not yet ratified by four countries, 
represents a major step forward in transnational cooperation. However, 
its language is so broad that it elides some of the principal management 
challenges facing this and all transboundary aquifers. The Article then 
looks at the legal and policy issues that local environmental problems 
and climate change present for the management of the aquifer and 
recommends a management and dispute resolution strategy based on the 
notion of “equitable apportionment.”   
The complexity and environmental importance of the region, as 
well as the looming threats presented by climate change, make the need 
for accurate and detailed scientific and technical information urgent and 
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crucial. Yet, relying on such information to manage such a complex 
natural resource also presents risks. Too often, the role of uncertainty in 
risk assessment and in legal and managerial decisions gets reduced or 
ignored.  
Lessening uncertainty requires reducing asymmetric information. 
The recent international agreement regarding the Guarani represents a 
significant (albeit preliminary) step forward in this regard. Increasing 
knowledge over the regulated resource demands categorizing “hard” and 
“soft” uncertainties. In addition, the regulatory framework must 
acknowledge the unitary nature of the aquifer while yet remaining 
sensitive to differing national and local priorities. This Article reviews 
the endogenous and exogenous challenges facing the Guarani Aquifer 
System. It looks particularly at those within and arising from Brazil. It 
then offers an international dispute resolution framework, drawn from 
the United States’ doctrine of equitable apportionment, and offers some 
proposed amendments to the multilateral agreement for managing the 
Guarani. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Guarani Aquifer System (“GAS” or “Guarani”) is a recently 
discovered, unfathomably large underground water system underlying 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina.
1
 Its proper management, 
particularly in the coming era of climate change and concomitant water 
shortages, looms increasingly vital, both to the oversitting nations and to 
the world at large.
2
 Nevertheless, transboundary groundwater 
management has received relatively little attention in international law 
until recently.
3
 Furthermore, despite the recent publication of Draft 
Articles on the Management of Transboundary Aquifers by the 
International Law Committee of the United Nations,
4
 transboundary 
groundwater law remains very much in flux. In addition, the recently 
signed agreement (“Acordo”) between the four countries that overlie the 
Guarani
5
 offers progress but no real solutions to the aquifer’s 
management dilemmas. 
This Article situates the managerial challenges facing the GAS 
within the larger challenges arising from multilateral and multifarious 
use regimes as well as by an unstable and rapidly changing environment. 
                                                          
1. The GAS is estimated to contain 37,000 km3 of freshwater. OFFICE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND ENV’T OF THE ORG. OF AM. STATES, WATER PROJECT SER. NO. 77, 
GUARANI AQUIFER SYSTEM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUARANI AQUIFER SYSTEM (Oct. 2005), available at 
www.oas.org/dsd/Events/english/Documents/OSDE_7Guarani.pdf. There is about 
37,600,000 km3 of freshwater on Earth. How much water is there on, in, and above 
Earth?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/earthhowmuch.html (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
2. David N. Cassuto & Romulo S.R. Sampaio, Keeping It Legal: Transboundary 
Management Challenges Facing Brazil and the Guarani, 36 WATER INT’L 661 (2011) 
(building upon many ideas first laid out in this piece, which was written for a special 
issue of Water International treating transboundary groundwater). 
3. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 66th sess, Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers, U.N. Doc. A/63/10; U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
(2008) [hereinafter Draft Articles]; Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A 
Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and 
International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 201, 222 (2003); Owen McIntyre, 
Fragmentation in International Water Resources Law: Reconciling the International Law 
Commission´s 2008 Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers with the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–
8, 2010). 
4. Draft Articles, supra note 3. 
5. Acordo sobre o Aquífero Garani [Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer], Aug. 2, 
2010, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Ministério Das Relações Exteriores [Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs] [hereinafter Acordo]. 
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It argues that no multilateral agreement can succeed (for the Guarani or 
any other transboundary groundwater resource) until domestic laws are 
harmonized both among themselves and with ecological realities. The 
Article categorizes domestic and multilateral policy challenges in light of 
various endogenous and exogenous threats and proposes a management 
and conflict resolution strategy. That proposed strategy builds on an 
international methodology already in existence
6
 that is itself based on the 
U.S. experience of equitable apportionment. The approach offered herein 
suggests a framework that will provide increased jurisdictional heft and 
enforceability to the Acordo. However, the strategy proffered here is not 
specific to the GAS. It is adaptable to other transboundary aquifer 
regimes with multilateral management agreements as well. 
Unfortunately, only two such agreements currently exist (including the 




Part II of this Article describes the regional ecology of the GAS and 
the endogenous and exogenous challenges it faces. It explains how these 
dilemmas arise from the inability of regulatory regimes to adjust to the 
cycle of hard and soft uncertainties. Part III looks at the Brazilian legal 
system as it relates to groundwater. Brazil overlies eighty percent of the 
GAS and is consequently the most influential of the four overlying 
nations. Yet, Brazil has a basic conflict within its water laws that 
impedes transboundary groundwater management.  
In Part IV, the international legal challenges presented by 
transboundary groundwater are examined in light of how they relate to 
the GAS. Part IV examines the Acordo, a multilateral agreement signed 
(but not yet ratified) by the four overlying countries and argues that, 
while the Acordo represents laudable progress, it is not yet sufficient to 
the task at hand. In addition to the aforementioned problems of domestic 
disharmony (which make effective multilateral management impossible), 
the Acordo lacks an effective enforcement mechanism and dispute 
resolution procedure. Part V proposes language to amend the Acordo to 
incorporate principles of equitable apportionment (drawn from U.S. 
                                                          
6. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Sovereignty and Cooperative Management of Shared 
Water Resources in a Time of Shrinking Availability: The Role of International Law at 
114, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: 
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010). 
7. Gabriel Eckstein, Hydraulic Harmony or Water Whimsy? Guarani Aquifer 
Countries Sign Agreement, INT’L WATER L. PROJECT BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010, 11:08 PM), 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2010/08/05/hydraulic-harmony-or-water-
whimsy-guarani-aquifer-countries-sign-agreement/ (suggesting that there are only two 
such agreements currently in existence). 
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water law) and to grant jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) to resolve disputes that arise among the signatory countries. 
II. OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL ECOLOGY AND 
ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS CHALLENGES FACING 
THE GAS 
A. A Brief Overview of the GAS 
The GAS—the world’s largest aquifer—underlies Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Argentina, constituting a continuous geological formation 
shared by the four countries.
8
 It was discovered just recently, in 1996,
9
 
and is named after the indigenous nation that carries the same name and 
has inhabited the region for centuries. The Guarani contains 30 trillion 
cubic meters of water, 1.2 million square kilometers, and comprises one 
of the most important eco-regions in the world.
10
 It is integrally 
connected through overland rivers (the Parana and the Paraguay) with the 
Pantanal, the largest wetland in the world, which is located in Bolivia, 
Paraguay, and Brazil.
11
 The GAS recharge zones are primarily located in 
Brazil and Paraguay, and the discharge zones are in Argentina and 
Uruguay.
12
 The aquifer’s annual recharge rate is estimated at forty-five to 
fifty-five cubic kilometers of water, which represents less than 0.2 
percent of the freshwater storage.
13
 The health of the GAS and the issues 
created by its transboundary overlap present a complex management 
                                                          
8. Maria Lúcia Navarro Lins Brzezinski, Regulating Transboundary Groundwater: 
Big Challenges for Brazil, at 1, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (DEC. 6–
8, 2010). 
9. Id. 
10. INSTITUTO SOCIOAMBIENTAL, ALMANAQUE BRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL [BRAZIL 
SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL ALAMANC] (Beto Ricardo & Maura Campanili eds., 2008). 
11. Id. at 297. 
12. See EDUARDO USUNOFF, WEB-BASED INFORMATION FOR INTEGRATED WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, OF A MULTI-NATIONAL AQUIFER: THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
FACILITY PROJECT ON THE GUARANÍ AQUIFER, available at 
http://s162n22.fau.edu/wis3/presentations/30_Usunoff_paper.pdf. 
13. Gerhard Schmidt & Fernando Larroza, Pedro Juan Caballero –– Ponta Porã: A 
Groundwater Transboundary Situation between Paraguay and Brasil, at 1, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY 
AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010). 
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dilemma, particularly in light of the absence of precise technical and 
scientific information related to underground water.  
Annual extraction levels of the Guarani currently hover around 1.04 
billion cubic meters per year, well within recharge levels of the aquifer 
as a whole and approximately 0.003 percent of the estimated 30 trillion 
cubic meters of water contained within it.
14
 At current levels of 
exploitation, the GAS could offer its four overlying nations fresh water 
for over 2,000 years.
15
 Although impressive at first glance, this statistic 
should not undermine the importance of integrated management policies 
among the overlying nations, especially in light of the exponential 
increase in pressure on groundwater resources worldwide.
16
 
Economics play a significant role in determining how the Guarani 
will be utilized. Since there are sufficient alternative surface water 
sources at present, it is generally not cost-effective to use water from the 
aquifer for irrigation or other heavily consumptive uses. However, as 
climate change shifts the amount and availability of other water, those 
economics could and likely will change.
17
 
                                                          
14. WORLD BANK, REP. NO. ICR00001198, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND 
RESULTS REPORT ON A GRANT TO ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUARANI 




15. L. Amore & U. Tröger, Transboundary Guarani Aquifer System and 
Groundwater Management Mechanisms, at 2, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010) (“The static water reserves were calculated as higher than 
29,551 km3 (4,000 km3 +), but the deep recharge in 1.4 km3/ano, indicating the 
occurrence of mining water in confined areas. The exploitable volumes were calculated 
in 2,014 km3 (+ 270 km3), or 6% of SAG reserves, considering the maximum drawdown 
of water levels by pumping as 400 m. If current exploitation was maintained at 1.04 
km3/ano, through the 1,800 wells that reach the SAG (a total of 8,000 known wells in the 
region), available reserves could be exploited by more than 2,000 years at current 
patterns of consumption.”).  
16. UNESCO, WATER: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD 
WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2 (2006), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001454/145405E.pdf. 
17. There are already signs of stress on surface water supplies. For example, Merin 
Lake, which is bordered by both Uruguay and Brazil, supplies water for much of 
Uruguay’s rice production. Brazil withdraws significant amounts for irrigation as well. 
See MVOTMA, Segunda Comunicacioun Nacional al Conferencia de las Partes en la 
Convencion Marco de las Nacional Unidas sobre el Cambio Climatico, Unidad del 
Cambio Climatico 226–27 (2004), available at 
http://www.cambioclimatico.gub.uy//index.php?option=com_search&Itemid=5 
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Uses of the Guarani’s waters vary by region. The majority goes into 
public water supplies, but significant amounts also go toward agricultural 
and industrial use and to recreation (primarily thermal tourism).
18
 Among 
the four overlying nations, Brazil relies most heavily on the Guarani. 
This is due to the country’s size and demographics and to the fact that it 
overlies the majority of the aquifer. Brazil’s extraction accounts for 
eighty-seven percent of the water withdrawn from the aquifer,
19
 with the 
state of São Paulo exerting the greatest pressure.
20
 
The regional ecology, as well as the complex socioeconomic 
framework, presents an array of managerial challenges. Social and 
economic pressures are influenced and, in some circumstances, fueled by 
regional and local zoning policies. From national zoning polices to local 
land-use choices, social needs and economic demands need to be 
factored into the GAS’s governance. In addition, the transboundary 
nature of the Guarani adds another layer of complexity. Figure 1 below 
illustrates the geographical reach of the GAS and offers an indication of 
some of the socioeconomic pressures and management dilemmas that it 
faces. For example, the portion of Brazil that overlies the aquifer 








                                                                                                                                  
&searchword=Segunda+comunicacion&searchphrase=any&ordering=newest (suggesting 
that as a result, demands for water from the lake are stressing the regional ecosystem, the 
most likely candidate for an alternative source is the Guarani). 
18. Amore & Tröger, supra note 15, at 3 (“In general, the main use of the waters of 
GAS is for public supply (66%). The industrial use (refrigerators, sugar/alcohol plants, 
etc.) reaches 16%, while in the countryside it is only 5%. Recreational uses in thermal 
areas have reached 13%, and 100% of the water in Argentina are intended for tourist use. 
In Paraguay and Uruguay more than 90% of GAS water is used to supply urban areas.”).  
19. Id. 
20. Schmidt & Larroza, supra note 13, at 2 (“Both in terms of population and 
groundwater production Brasil has a dominating role in the SAG [Guarani Aquifer 
System – Sistema Acuífero Guarani] region: 87% of the SAG population of 92 million 
inhabitants live on the Brasilian territory, and about 93% of the recent groundwater 
production (1040 million m3 in 2007) happens in Brasil, mainly in the federal state of São 
Paulo.”). Along with the state of São Paulo, another seven Brazilian states overly the 
Guarani Aquifer: Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Paraná, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso 
do Sul, Goiás and Minas Gerais. 
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In the Parts to follow, we explore the regional ecology and regional 
legal instruments applicable to the GAS. We begin, however, with an 
analysis of the Brazilian legal framework.  
B. Endogenous and Exogenous Challenges Facing Policy 
Makers 
We identify two types of challenges facing sound policymaking for 
the Guarani: endogenous and exogenous challenges.  
1. Endogenous Challenges 
Endogenous challenges are those inherent to the hydrology of the 
aquifer. Hydrology is by nature a complex science. When dealing with 
an aquifer as large and varied as the Guarani, as well as a dearth of 
                                                          
21. Aquífero Guarani, WIKIPEDIA, http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aqu%C3%ADfero_ 
Guarani (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
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precise and consolidated scientific information regarding groundwater 
resources,
22
 hydrology becomes more complicated still. That complexity, 
coupled with the enormous geographical scale of the GAS, raises 
problems of soft uncertainty. Soft uncertainty arises “where [a] precise 
outcome cannot be predicted but a probability distribution can be 
specified . . . .”23 For example, the hydrology of the region, while not 
completely mapped, is a knowable unknown. The obstacles are, for the 
most part, knowable and their potential impacts and benefits calculable. 
That soft uncertainty has implications not only for instrumental 
managerial policies like the jurisdictional debate highlighted below,
24
 but 
also for groundwater policies that aim to balance development pressures 
with the ecological health of the region.
25
 Naturally, as the science of 
hydrology advances, more information will become available and the 
concomitant uncertainty will abate.  
Ironically, as more is learned about the GAS, new uncertainties 
replace those just resolved. It is a never-ending cycle. Thus, neither 
endogenous challenges nor soft uncertainties will ever disappear. A 
sound management policy acknowledges and allows for this reality. 
2. Exogenous Challenges 
The other types of challenges facing the Guarani are exogenous. 
Exogenous challenges derive from external phenomena. The 
uncertainties generated by exogenous forces are often “hard.” Hard 
uncertainty occurs “where one does not even know the parameters of the 
outcomes.”26 Indeed, it is not even possible to know the nature of the 
                                                          
22. P.C. Villar, Moving Toward Managing the Guarani Aquifer: The Brazilian 
Case, at 1, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: 
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010) 
(noting that the complexity of the GAS “increases as groundwater depends on science to 
reveal its characteristics and the risks it runs. Such characteristic hinders its political and 
social appeal, since its importance and the emergency of the impacts are not perceivable 
to laymen. If on one hand the lack of technical information hinders the creation of a 
policy for this resource, on the other, the lack of social understanding of the theme makes 
the practical legitimation of a possible aquifer legislation more difficult.”).  
23. Aaron Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292, 296 (1966).  
24. See infra Part III.A, note 51 and accompanying text. 
25. See Amore & Tröger, supra note 15, at 3 (highlighting some of the risks 
imposed by development pressures: “In general, main concentrated threats on water 
quality of the SAG are related to risk of manmade contamination in the outcrop zones. 
Regarding water availability greater risks are interference between wells and mining 
waters from areas under intensive use.”); see also Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 2. 
26. Wildavsky, supra note 23, at 296. 
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risk. For example, climate change presents a problem of hard 
uncertainty.
27
 The dimensions of the threat are not yet measurable and 
the impacts remain mostly unknown.
28
 Therefore, the character of these 
“unknown unknowns” prevents policy makers from determining the 
scope of the risks and makes it impossible to formulate precise 
managerial strategies. A precautionary approach is therefore both 
prudent and necessary, although it too creates uncertainties and 
managerial challenges.
29
 As a practical matter, soft uncertainty lends 
itself to cost-benefit analysis and other risk assessment methods. Hard 
                                                          
27. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 
1590 (2008).  
28. See Magdalena A.K. Muir, Managing Transboundary Aquifers for Climate 
Change: Challenges and Opportunities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010) (“Some key climate impacts for water quantity and quality 
are saline intrusion and contamination of aquifers. Changes in seasonal and annual 
precipitation, flooding, temperature and extreme weather events also affect the recharge 
and discharge of aquifers, and could lead to contamination of aquifers even where there is 
no water scarcity. Last, climate impacts for aquifers may be greater for coastal aquifers, 
or in arid and semi-arid regions, such as the Mediterranean, Middle East and northern 
Africa.”).  
29. See David Magnus, Risk Management Versus the Precautionary Principle: 
Agnotology as a Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms, in 
AGNOTOLOGY: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF IGNORANCE 251–53 (Robert N. Proctor & 
Londa Schiebinger eds. 2008); Cass Sunstein critiques the Precautionary Principle by 
arguing that it leads to regulatory paralysis:  
The precautionary principle might seem to call for stringent regulation of 
genetic engineering on the theory that this technology contains at least some 
risk of causing ecological harm. But such regulation would also create risks of 
adverse effects, simply because genetic engineering holds out a prospect of 
producing ecological and health benefits. The precautionary principle would 
seem both to require and to forbid stringent regulation of genetic engineering. 
The same can be said for many activities . . . such as nuclear power and non-
therapeutic cloning, simply because risks are on all sides of the situation. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 11 YALE L.J. 
61, 93 (2002). 
However, environmentalist opposition to things like GMOs finds support in a statistical 
risk distribution methodology called a “power law,” which is used to measure risk in 
complex systems (i.e. systems made up of multiple interactive systems). Under a power 
law analysis, freak outcomes weigh heavily in the analysis as for example, when one is 
measuring the likelihood of floods. So, for example, if one is graphing the average birth 
weight of a puppy, one would not expect gross deviations from the mean. On the other 
hand, if one were tracking hurricanes, there is the potential for radical deviation. Extreme 
events are more likely in complex systems. For a useful discussion of power laws, see 
MANFRED SCHROEDER, FRACTALS, CHAOS, POWER LAWS: MINUTES FROM AN INFINITE 
PARADISE 103–119 (1991).  
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uncertainty, by contrast, cannot be quantified and thus cannot be 
contrasted or its risks accurately described.
30
 
Managing for hard uncertainty involves acknowledging that much 
of what is not known is unknown. This means that the regulatory state 
must be able to adapt to emergent challenges. The goal would be to bring 
the unknown unknowns of hard uncertainty into the realm of the known 
unknowns (soft uncertainty). From there, it becomes possible to shift 
uses and policies to address and to adapt to the new information. In this 
way, hard uncertainty converts to soft uncertainty, which then can move 
into the realm of the known. So, the desired progression is from 
unknown unknown to known unknown to known known. Once complete, 
the cycle begins anew. 
III. BRAZILIAN LAWS AND POLICIES REGARDING THE 
GAS 
This Part focuses on Brazilian laws and policies regarding the GAS 
for several reasons. First, as noted supra, the largest portion of the 
aquifer underlies Brazilian territory (61.65 percent of the total area of the 
aquifer versus 20.98 percent under Argentina, 8.05 percent under 
Paraguay and 3.32 percent under Uruguay),
31
 thus making Brazilian 
management practices potentially more influential. In addition, of the 92 
million people living in the Guarani Aquifer region, 80 million of them 
live in Brazil—forty-three percent of that country’s population. 
Furthermore, the GAS spans eight Brazilian states (Rio Grande do Sul, 
Santa Catarina, Paraná, São Paulo, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, 
Goiás and Minas Gerais) and more than 500 municipalities.  
As discussed below, Brazilian law is not clear on the managerial 
hierarchy concerning transboundary groundwater even among and 
amidst the various Brazilian states. This uncertainty will have a 
significant impact on the implementation of the recently signed (but not 
yet ratified) international agreement, the Acordo.
32
 This impact is due in 
part to the fact that the Acordo acknowledges the authority of each 
overlying nation to manage that portion of the aquifer over which it 
sits.
33
 As a result, Brazil’s management practices will have a 
                                                          
30. Soft uncertainty arises “where [a] precise outcome cannot be predicted but a 
probability distribution can be specified.” Hard uncertainty occurs “where one does not 
even know the parameters of the outcomes.” Wildavsky, supra note 23, at 296.  
31. Brzezinski, supra note 8, at 2.  
32. See Acordo, supra note 5.  
33. See id. art. II.  
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proportionally larger impact on the aquifer’s health and resilience. 
Consequently, Brazil’s responsibility to implement sound water 
management practices is proportionally larger as well.
34
  
Second, the scope of Brazil’s activities requires different, yet 
integrated management strategies. Even within one single activity, water 
needs and impacts can vary as it does in agribusiness, where intense crop 
use can lead to considerable drawdown in one region, whereas industrial 
livestock production in another region might lead to groundwater 
contamination.
35
 The GAS is thus vulnerable to a wide range of activities 
and policies, some of which do not even necessarily implicate the aquifer 
directly.
36
 For example, an indirect but highly significant impact on the 
GAS comes from land-use law. Brazilian municipalities enjoy significant 
legal and managerial authority over zoning. These local land-use choices, 
all of which affect drawdown, recharge, and contamination, pose their 
own set of challenges for groundwater management.
37
   
Third, from a practical perspective, the background and expertise of 
the authors
38
 permits us far more insight into the international and 
Brazilian legal frameworks for transboundary groundwater management. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that a truly comprehensive analysis of the 
GAS must include a similar treatment of Paraguay, Uruguay, and 






                                                          
34. Villar, supra note 22 (highlighting Brazilian responsibility regarding the 
Guarani Aquifer in light of the fact “the biggest part of the aquifer is located in Brazilian 
soil”).  
35. See Amore & Tröger, supra note 15 (referring to some of the threats faced by 
the Guarani Aquifer).  
36. WORLD BANK, supra note 14.  
37. H.S.V. Totin et. al., Climate and Land Use Change Impacts on Groundwater 
Quality in the Beninese Coastal Basin of the Transboundary Aquifer System Benin-
Nigeria-Togo, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: 
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010) 
(stressing that “land use and land cover (LULC) changes are one of the main human 
induced activities altering the groundwater system”).  
38. See Staff, Brazil-American Institute for Law and Environment, PACE LAW, 
http://www.pace.edu/school-of-law/centers-and-special-programs/institutes/brazil-
american-institute-law-and-environment-baile/staff-3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).  
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A. Brazilian Legal Approaches to Endogenous Issues 
Brazilian environmental law is well-developed and highly complex. 
It includes a constitutional provision dedicated to the environment
39
 and 
many other federal, state, and municipal statutes and regulations, all of 
which intertwine to form a holistic legal regime. This Subpart examines 
existing laws and policies in order to identify likely sources of 
endogenous and exogenous challenges for the GAS.  
Historically, Brazilian legislators have paid very little attention to 
groundwater.
40
 Consequently, the legal framework for dealing with 
groundwater issues is of comparatively recent vintage. However, 
growing pressure over access to and protection of this scarce resource is 
now forcing policy makers to address the regulatory gaps and 
inconsistencies between surface and groundwater management.
41
 
The 1988 Federal Constitution and the 1997 National Water Policy 
Act established a new paradigm in Brazilian water law. Prior to 1988, 
private ownership over water resources was permissible.
42
 The 1988 
Constitution declared that the environment is an asset of common use 
and essential to a healthy quality of life. This principle includes water.
43
 
Following from this idea of the environment as a public good, under 
Brazilian law, no one owns water and all have equal and unfettered 
access to it.
44
 Codifying statutes on the nature of water as a public good 
soon followed. For example, Article 99 of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code 
states that rivers and oceans are public assets and Article 1 of the 
National Water Policy Act declares that water lies within the public 
domain.
45
 This constitutional and statutory combination places water 
firmly within the legal category of public assets of common use.   
                                                          
39. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.). 
40. Antonio H. Benjamin & Cláudia L. Marques, The Water Giant Awakes: An 
Overview of Water Law in Brazil, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2185, 2205–06 (2005).  
41. See id.  
42. CID TOMANIK POMPEU, DIREITO DE ÁGUAS NO BRASIL 41–45 (2006).  
43. VLADIMIR PASSOS, DE FREITAS ÁGUAS: ASPECTOS JURÍDICOS E AMBIENTAIS 17–
18 (JURUÁ, CURITIBA 2002).  
44. Brazilian law construes equal access according to the principle of isonomy, 
which allows for differing capacities, needs, and uses to dictate water management and 
allocation policies. See National Water Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, de 8 
janeiro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 09.01.1997 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.oas.org/usde/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/Brazil-
Law_No._9,433_(1997).pdf. 
45. See CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 99 (2002) (Braz.); see also National Water 
Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, de 8 janeiro de 1997, art. 1, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 09.01.1997 (Braz.), available at 
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However, the aforementioned statutory shift from private to public 
ownership of water focused primarily on surface water. The discussion 
of groundwater in the 1988 Constitution confined itself to jurisdictional 
issues regarding the scope and nature of the respective managerial 
authority of the federal and state governments. This division of authority 
has generated considerable confusion and conflicting interpretations. 
Article 20, Section III of the 1988 Constitution tasks the federal 
government with managing lakes, rivers, and watercourses on lands 
within its domain that wash more than one state and that serve as 
boundaries with other countries.
46
 It also extends jurisdiction over 
beaches and the territorial sea.
47
 It does not, however, confer any explicit 
authority over groundwater. By contrast, Article 26 entrusts states with 
managing groundwater.
48
 This bifurcated authority creates a serious 
problem for aquifers such as the Guarani that underlie multiple states and 
extend beyond national jurisdiction.
49
 Since groundwater resources (i.e. 
the Guarani) can be transboundary, it is not clear whether transboundary 
groundwater would fall under state or federal control.  
To settle this problem, several lawmakers proposed a constitutional 
amendment. The amendment seeks to resolve the inherent conflict 
arising from designating transboundary resources as the province of the 
federal government while placing control over groundwater resources 
within state control. The amendment explicitly grants federal jurisdiction 
over transboundary water, regardless of whether it is surface or ground.
50
 
Federal control seems the proper and logical solution because of the need 
for a central authority and unifying regulatory regime. As things 
currently stand, it is not clear that the Brazilian federal government has 
the authority to manage the Guarani nor the ability to bind individual 




                                                                                                                                  
http://www.oas.org/usde/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/Brazil-
Law_No._9,433_(1997).pdf. 
46.  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20, § III (Braz.).  
47. Id.  
48. Id. art. 26.  
49. This is not an uncommon problem. The U.S. often has separate regimes for 
groundwater and surface water, leading to considerable confusion and legal disarray.  
50. See S. Rep. No. 1.283, DE 2010 (Aug. 4, 2010) (Braz.), available at 
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t=82128&tp=1 [hereinafter 
Brazilian Senate Report].  
51. Villar, supra note 22, at 3 (“Presently, the legal groundwater guardianship is 
performed almost exclusively by the states and with extremely different implementation 
levels, even when the same aquifer is shared.”).  
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The alternative—entrusting individual states, each with differing 
priorities and management strategies, with controlling a shared resource 
of multilateral and international significance—creates irreconcilable 
federalist tension and jeopardizes international agreements and treaties. 
Rather than amend the Constitution, some judges and scholars argue that 
the concept of watercourses in Article 20 should be broadly construed to 
include groundwater that serves as boundaries with other countries 
and/or wash more than one state.
52
 However, this interpretation does not 
enjoy widespread acceptance not least because it seems to flout the plain 
language of the Constitution.  
The existing text of Article 20 of the Brazilian Constitution states as 
follows:  
The following are property of the Union: 3. the lakes, rivers and any 
watercourses in lands within its domain or that wash more than one 
state, that serve as boundaries with other countries or that extend into 




Article 26, which deals with assets falling under state jurisdiction, 
states:  
The property of the states includes: 1. surface or subterranean waters, 
flowing, emerging or in deposit, with the exception, in this case, of 
those resulting from work carried out by the Union, as provided by 
law . . .
54
  
Read together, the plain language of the two articles makes clear 
that surface water and groundwater have distinct management regimes 
and that groundwater pertains to the states. However, neither provision 
directly addresses the issue of transboundary groundwater. From this 
language and accompanying lack of guidance arises the jurisdictional 
conflict over groundwater management. 
 
                                                          
52.  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20 (Braz.). CID TOMANIK 
POMPEU, supra note 42, at 55-58 (presenting the conflicting views about State jurisdiction 
over groundwater that serves as boundaries with other countries and/or wash more than 
one state in arts. 20 and 26 and of the Brazilian Constitution). 
53. For an unofficial English version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, see 
República Federativa de Brasil/ Federative Republic of Brazil Constitución Política de 
1988, con reformas de 1996, em inglês  1988 Constitution, with 1996 reforms in english,  
POLITICAL DATABASE OF THE AMERICAS, GEORGETOWN UNIV., 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/english96.html#mozTocId30141 (last 
visited May 3, 2011).  
54. Id. 
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The proposed amendment would change Article 26 to read: 
The following are property of the Union: 3. the lakes, surface and 
groundwater, including those in aquifers, rivers and any watercourses 
in lands within its domain or that wash more than one state, that serve 
as boundaries with other countries or that extend into foreign territory 
or proceed therefrom, as well as bank lands and river beaches;
55
 
As amended, the Constitution would confer jurisdiction over the 
groundwater resources shared by more than one state to the federal 
government.  
Unfortunately, the proposed amendment stands little chance of 
success. The sponsoring Senator had argued that the ambiguity over state 
and federal jurisdiction arose from a drafting error, which the proposed 
amendment would remedy.
56
 Ten years after the amendment was 
proposed, however, another report maintained that there was no error.
57
 
The report’s author, Senator Kátia Abreu, maintained that control over 
groundwater was intentionally left with the individual states because the 
legislature had intended to create a decentralized management structure 
similar to the 1997 Water Policy Act.
58
 Under this view, allocating 
control over groundwater to the federal government would violate both 
the statute and the intended meaning of the Constitution. 
However, the logic of Senator Abreu’s report does not withstand 
serious scrutiny. A decentralized management approach only makes 
sense when the resource in question is not shared multinationally. It 
would be impossible for the federal government to conduct a coherent 
foreign policy if transboundary negotiations were carried on by various 
states whose interests may not align and which might take different 
positions with respect to the management of the resource. In addition, the 
Constitution does not propound a decentralized approach for every 
situation, as demonstrated by the provision allocating control over 
transboundary surface waters to the federal government.  
Clearly, there is no philosophical issue at stake here. Rather, this is 
an instance of conflicting provisions and only one logical resolution. 
Multistate control over transboundary resources cannot possibly succeed. 
A centralized regulatory regime is the only alternative. Nevertheless, 
despite the urgency of the issue and the clear path to resolution, the 
                                                          
55. See Brazilian Senate Report, supra note 50. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
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Meanwhile, the legislature has enacted a different set of regulations 
to close the gap between the groundwater and surface water management 
regimes. In 2001, the National Water Resources Council (“CNRH”) 
enacted a series of resolutions aimed at integrating ground and surface 
water management.
60
 They include Resolutions 9/2000, 15/2001, 
22/2002, 48/2005, 76/2007, 91/2008, 107/2010, and 126/2011.
61
  
Resolution 9/2000 created a Committee tasked with integrating 
groundwater into the 1997 Water Policy Act and resolving compatibility 
issues between surface and groundwater laws and policies.
62
 Resolution 
15/2001 acknowledges those jurisdictional challenges and some of the 
exogenous threats facing underground water and creates a general 
regulatory framework that takes into account the peculiarities of 
groundwater.
63
 Resolution 22/2002 deals specifically with the need to 
rely on scientific information about the hydrology of aquifers and 
requires that National Resource Plans contain such information.
64
 It 
constitutes an important regulatory step forward to address endogenous 
and exogenous challenges facing groundwater in Brazil. Resolution 
48/2005 regulates the costs for the use of the water embedded in the 
1997 Water Policy Act.
65
 Resolution 76/2007 further strengthens the 
groundwater regulatory apparatus by creating a general framework 
covering extraction of mineral and thermal waters found in underground 
water deposits.
66
 Resolution 91/2008 extends the different categories 
created by the 1997 Water Act based on preponderant use of the 
resources to cover groundwater.
67
 Prior to Resolution 91/2008, those 
categories existed only for surface water. Groundwater had been subject 
                                                          
59. For an updated status of the proposed constitutional amendment, see 
PROPOSTA DE EMENDA À CONSTITUIÇÃO, Nº 43 de 2000 [Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment no. 43 of 2000], SENADO FEDERAL [BRAZILIAN SENATE], 
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=45833 (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012). 
60. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2213. 
61. See Resoluções [Resolutions], CONSELHO NACIONAL DE RECURSOS HÍDRICOS 
[BRAZILIAN NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL],  
http://www.cnrh.gov.br/sitio/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14 (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012). 
62. Resolução No. 9, de 21 de Junho de 2000 (Braz.).  
63. Resolução No. 15, de 11 de Janeiro de 2001 (Braz.).  
64. Resolução No. 22, de 24 de Maio de 2002 (Braz.).  
65. Resolução No. 48, de 21 de Março de 2005 (Braz.). 
66. Resolução No. 76, de 16 de Outubro de 2007 (Braz.).  
67. Resolução No. 91, de 5 de Novembro de 2008 (Braz.).  
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to a specific plan, called the National Groundwater Plan, which was then 
integrated into the National Water Plan, approved by Resolution 
99/2009. Resolution 107/2010 instituted criteria to be adopted for the 
planning, implementation, and operation of the Groundwater Integrated 
Qualitative and Quantitative Monitoring National Network.
68
 Finally, 
Resolution 126/2011 creates a national registry of surface and 
groundwater users. It is an important step toward inventorying the 




In addition to the aforementioned regulation from the CNRH, the 
National Environmental Council (“CONAMA”)70 also promulgated 
water quality standards in 2005 (Resolution 357/2005)
71
 and 
groundwater quality standards in 2008 (Resolution 396/2008).
72
  
This extensive list of resolutions forms a useful framework for 
groundwater regulation. However, it does not correct the ongoing 
inability to integrate water policies with land use, climate change, and 
other environmental policies with direct impact on water management 
strategies. A more robust legal framework—one that relies less on 
regulation and more on statutes—is needed, particularly in light of the 
jurisdictional conflicts highlighted above.  
The need for integration has become particularly urgent as a result 
of ballooning demand for water by agribusiness. Yet, Senator Abreu 
(author of the report criticizing the proposed amendment) is one of the 
strongest congressional voices on behalf of agribusiness. She also serves 
as the President of the Brazilian National Agriculture Confederation, an 
                                                          
68. Resolução No. 99, de 26 de Março de 2009 (Braz.); Resolução No. 107, de 13 
de Abril de 2010 (Braz.).  
69. Resolução No. 126, de 29 de Junho de 2011 (Braz.).  
70. See generally Luiz Fernando Henry Sant´Anna, General Overview of Brazilian 
Environmental Law, 15-SPG INT´L L. PRACTICUM 22, 22 (Spring 2002) (“The main 
objective of CONAMA, which is the National Council for the Environment, is to 
deliberate, within the scope of its competence, about rules and standards that are essential 
to public health and safety and that are compatible with an ecologically balanced 
environment, and to support, study, and propose to the Ministry of the Environment . . . 
governmental policy relating to the environment and natural resources.”). 
71. Resolução Conama No. 357, de 17 de Março de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 18.3.2005 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/legiabre.cfm?codlegi=459. 
72. Resolução Conama No. 396, de 3 de Abril de 2008, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 3.4.2008 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/legiabre.cfm?codlegi=562. 
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entity representing the interests of agribusiness.
73
 While the stated 
reasons for opposing the amendment defy logic, one might reasonably 
assume that agribusiness views state regulators as potentially friendlier 
and more receptive to their needs and objectives, and thus more likely to 
create a more business-friendly regulatory regime. After all, state 
regulators work in the respective state capitals, while federal regulators 
tend to be farther away—both physically and philosophically. Thus, it is 
not surprising that attempts to allocate more control over groundwater to 
the federal government have met with fierce resistance from well-funded 
interest groups. 
 Amidst this constitutional uncertainty over groundwater 
jurisdiction, states overlying the Guarani have been attempting to control 
access and promote conservation.
74
 For instance, the state of São Paulo, 
the main consumer of water from the Guarani, created the State Water 
Resources Council (“CERH-SP”) to regulate and protect the State’s 
water resources.
75
 It established restricted zones for the perforation of 
tubular wells in the city of Ribeirão Preto, one of the major consumers 
within São Paulo, in order to shield the Guarani from contamination.
76
 
São Paulo also enacted a set of groundwater policies aimed at dealing 
with the socioeconomic pressures arising from the region’s high level of 
urbanization and industrial and agricultural activities.
77
 Given the 
importance of São Paulo—both economically and socially—a regulatory 
framework addressing groundwater (São Paulo’s groundwater comes 
mainly from the GAS) is somewhat reassuring. Nevertheless, as 
                                                          
73. See Sobre o Sistema CAN, NAT’L AGRIC. CONFEDERATION,  
http://www.canaldoprodutor.com.br/sobre-sistema-cna/quem-e-quem (last visited Sept. 
24, 2012). 
74. See generally Villar, supra note 22 (“The absence of a specific federal law on 
groundwater, the state domain of the aquifers regardless of their geographic limits, and 
the municipal competency to manage the use and occupation of the soil generated a great 
lack of articulation and freedom between the three levels of power: Union, States and 
Municipalities.”).  
75. See São Paulo State Water Resources Council, SIGRH, 
http://www.sigrh.sp.gov.br/cgibin/sigrh_carrega.exe?f=/index/index.html&lwgactw=616.
6685986030287 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).  
76. See São Paulo State Water Resources Council, Deliberation n. 65 (Sept. 4, 
2006), available at 
http://www.sigrh.sp.gov.br/cgibin/sigrh_home_colegiado.exe?COLEGIADO=CRH&TM
A= DELIBERACAO&lwgactw=503582. 
77. Lei No. 6.134, de 2 de Junho de 1988 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.cetesb.sp.gov.br/licenciamentoo/legislacao/estadual/leis/1988_Lei_Est_6134.
pdf; São Paulo State Decree n. 32,955 (June 2, 1988), available at 
http://www.al.sp.gov.br/repositorio/legislacao/decreto/1991/decreto%20n.32.955,%20de
%2007.02.1991.htm. 
 2013] Hard, Soft & Uncertain: The Guarani Aquifer 21 
previously noted, a state regulatory regime cannot possibly manage a 
transboundary groundwater resource effectively. Consequently, the GAS 
remains imperiled.   
Another example of a brewing conflict stemming from the use of 
the aquifer lies in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, where the passage of 
Resolution 8 in July 2009 empowers the state’s Environmental Authority 
to require permits for property owners seeking to operate wells on their 
land.
78
 However, as the agency begins rationing permits to prevent 
groundwater overdraft, property owners whose title predates the 1988 
Constitution could potentially file takings claims.
79
 Their argument 
would be that they owned the water prior to 1988 and the state took it 
without offering compensation. The argument against compensating 
those whose water rights were expropriated arises from Article 8 of the 
Water Code.
80
 Article 8 states that water can be privately held but that 
ownership is conditioned on the waters not being declared assets of 
common use. Because the 1988 Constitution, Article 99 of the 2002 Civil 
Code,
81
 and the 1997 Water Policy Act
82
 all declare water to fall under 




In addition to the already troublesome jurisdictional problem over 
groundwater resources, power over land-use policies is divided among 
federal, state, and municipal authorities, with the majority of power 
going to municipalities. Article 30, Sections I and II of the Brazilian 
Constitution empower municipalities to legislate over matters of local 
                                                          
78. Resolução Semac No. 08, de 6 de Julho de 2009, arts. 1 & 2, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO 
ESTADO DE MATO GROSSO DO SUL de 7.7.2009 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.imasul.ms.gov.br/controle/ShowFile.php?id=111055.  
79. For a more detailed discussion regarding groundwater and the issue of takings in 
Brazil, see generally David N. Cassuto & Rômulo S. R. Sampaio, Water Law in the 
United States and Brazil –– Climate Change & Two Approaches to Emerging Water 
Poverty, 35 WM. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 371, 397–400 (2011). 
80. See Decreto No. 24.643, de 10 Julho de 1934, arts. 139-144, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 10.7.1934 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/D24643.htm. 
81. See Lei No. 10.406, de 10 de Janeiro de 2002, arts. 98, 99, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 1.11.2002 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/L10406.htm. 
82. National Water Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, de 8 janeiro de 1997, art. 
1, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 09.1.1997 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9433.htm. 
83. See Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at 399; see also CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL 
[C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).  
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impact.
84
 The above-stated example of the city of Ribeirão Preto is one 
such instance. Land-use policies must take into account the potential 
negative impacts on overall management policies for the conservation 
and sustainable use of the GAS.
85
   
Absent a centralized regulatory regime, however, local water and 
land-use management initiatives, well-intentioned though they may be, 
cannot succeed. They can cause interstate and intrastate conflicts, and 
their resolution may then generate new conflicts with other state or local 
management policies. Meanwhile, there exists no congruity with the 
national position with respect to international cooperation. Not only does 
this impede cooperative federalism and international diplomacy, it makes 
it all but impossible to ascertain best practices for maintaining and 
sustaining the resource while safeguarding the health and preservation of 
local inhabitants and ecosystems. 
It bears stressing that a centralized management system for 
transboundary groundwater does not foreclose individual states from 
participating in the regulatory process.
86
 Local input regarding proper use 
and management is crucial to any effective management regime. In 
addition, subterranean hydrology is becoming increasingly sophisticated. 
Some experts suggest that the impacts of certain uses of transboundary 
groundwater resources can be entirely localized.
87
 For example, if a 
portion of the Guarani is all but entirely bounded by impermeable rock 
such that local drawdowns or contamination do not impact the larger 
aquifer, it makes little sense to allocate the management of that portion 
of the aquifer to federal control. In such circumstances, state and local 
authorities should retain managerial authority in cooperation with the 
federal regime. This synergistic approach is particularly important given 
the abundance of soft and hard uncertainty presented by groundwater 
                                                          
84. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] (Braz.). 
85. See Amore & Tröger, supra note 15, at 3 (“[T]he combination of increased 
water use, lack of adequate sanitation and amendment of land use can lead to a rapid 
modification of the current situation and the emergence of new critical areas.”).  
86. See id. (noting that “users and local communities must be engaged on rational 
use, as well as national governments, state and local authorities should strengthen the 
management and protection measures of groundwater in order to prevent emerging 
conflicts”).  
87. See id. (discussing a study of the Guarani Aquifer System which demonstrated 
that “[i]nternally, each area presents special characteristics of flows, naturally slow 
through the rock pores and fissures. In the transition between the northern and southern 
areas, the groundwater flow is limited by the occurrence of deep tectonic movement . . 
.”).  
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management.
88
 The next Subpart looks at the exogenous challenges 
presented by climate change. 
B. The Brazilian Legal Approach to Exogenous Issues 
Exogenous issues are, by definition, unknown. However, the causes 
are sometimes identifiable. Climate change offers an example of an 
identifiable source of exogenous challenges of particular relevance to 
groundwater management and water availability in general. Long periods 
of drought are becoming more frequent, even in humid states in the south 
of the country such as Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul.
89
 A major project 
aimed at diverting water from the San Francisco River to the arid 
northeast region of Brazil offers another example of how water 
management policies in a country known for its water abundance must 
now focus on avoiding water shortages.
90
 In addition, the ongoing 
controversy over the construction of the Belo Monte Dam in the state of 
Pará is fueled in part by the fact that the increasing and worsening cycles 
of drought in the Amazon make hydropower increasingly unfeasible.
91
 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, there 
is “high confidence” that northeastern Brazil “will suffer a decrease in 
water resources due to climate change.”92 The report projects significant 
adverse impacts on agriculture, water supply, energy production, and 
health. While dry regions will become drier, there will also be changes in 
rainfall patterns and runoff in traditionally humid zones. This will impact 
water availability and quality and present challenges to infrastructure.
93
 
According to a World Bank report, climate changes are expected to cause 
higher levels of evapotranspiration in the Guarani Aquifer region that 
will affect both aquifer use levels and recharge rates.
94
 The long-term 
                                                          
88. As we have argued elsewhere, this synergistic approach is vital to any functional 
water law regime. See Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at 376–78. 
89. See, e.g., Carlos Caminada & Carla Simoes, Brazil Drought Threatens 10 
Million Tons of Corn, Soy, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=a7Ks4iGegt8o. 
90. See generally Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at 405 (providing a general 
assessment of the overall impacts of climate change in Brazil).  
91. See David N. Cassuto, Belo Monte: The Legal Waters Continue to Roil, JURIST 
(Dec. 9, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/david-cassuto-brazil-dam.php. 
92. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 175 (2008) (emphasis added). 
93. Noah D. Hall et al., Climate Change and Freshwater Resources, WTR NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT 30, 34–35 (2008). 
94. See WORLD BANK, supra note 14; see also COOLEY ET AL., PACIFIC INSTITUTE & 
UNEP, UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING THE RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR 
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implications of this and other climatic shifts are likely to be significant 
and ongoing even as their full dimensions are unknown.  
Brazil implemented a national climate change policy, the National 
Climate Change Policy Act (“NCCPA”), at the end of 2009 that 
highlights the need to manage natural resources in light of the risks posed 
by climate change.
95
 However, the policy offers guidelines rather than 
any clear plan of action. Specific regulatory measures were left to the 
executive branch to enact and were also delegated to states and 
municipalities. In 2010, the first step on regulating the NCCPA was 
conceived. Decree n. 7,390 of 9 December 2010 was enacted with the 
purpose of regulating the NCCPA.
96
 While the Decree provided more 
specific guidance on the implementation aspects of the NCCPA, it 
remains quite broad and lacks concrete enforceable rules.
97
  
Incorporating the guidelines of the NCCPA and regulations into 
existing water law presents significant challenges. The principles 
embedded in the 1997 National Water Policy Act demonstrate an 
emerging awareness that water management must adapt to modern 
environmental realities, including climate change.
98
 Together with the 
2009 NCCPA, principles such as the precautionary approach, 
intergenerational equity, multiple use, and risk assessment now infuse 
the Brazilian water regime. However, enforcement remains a significant 
issue for Brazil as well as for the other three countries overlying the 
GAS.
99
 In addition, there is an inherent challenge to managing for 
unknown threats, especially when it involves acting counter to public 
opinion and/or powerful political and business interests.  
It is hard to imagine a politician easily convincing her constituents 
to support her vote to oppose a program that will bring immediate and 
identifiable benefits because she believes it will increase vulnerability to 
                                                                                                                                  
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS 13 (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://www.pacinst.org/reports/transboundary_waters/transboundary_water_and_climate_
report.pdf. 
95. See Lei No. 12.187, de 29 de Dezembro de 2009, arts. 4, 5, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 30.12.2009 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccvil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2009/Lei/L12187.htm.  
96. Decreto No. 7,343 de 9 de Dezembro de 2010, art. 1 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Decreto/D7390.htm. 
97. See id. 
98. Hall et al., supra note 93, at 34; see also Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, at 
410. 
99. LESLEY MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 178–85 (2008); Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 79, 
at 411. 
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an as yet unidentified threat that may manifest at some unknown time. 
Clearly, too much caution can cause societal paralysis. However, too 
little caution leaves a society unprepared and unable to respond to 
emergent challenges.
100
 The ideal regulatory state offers sufficient 
predictability to enable regulated entities to understand the parameters 
under which they must operate while retaining the flexibility to adapt to 




The task now facing Brazil involves fashioning an independent 
regulatory apparatus that can withstand campaigns to manipulate public 
opinion and undermine sound policymaking. Sound water policymaking 
in a world in the midst of climate change requires implementing the 
principles and guidelines already in place despite the pressures created 
by large-scale development projects that continue to fail to account for 
the new water-scarce reality. It also involves constructing a regulatory 
state capable of adjusting to unanticipated shifts in the status quo. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW AS 
APPLIED TO THE GAS  
Further complicating the challenges discussed above is the 
international dimension of managing the GAS. There exists a general 
legal framework for managing transboundary groundwater resources. 
Moreover, there is a set of multilateral agreements of particular relevance 
to the GAS. They serve as model international law for issues involving 
shared water resources. This framework, however, lacks the means 
through which to manage the endogenous and exogenous challenges 
facing the aquifer. This Part analyzes that framework and explains why it 
is inadequate to the task at hand.  
                                                          
100. For more information on the pros and cons of the precautionary principle, see 
Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1285, 1325 (2011); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense to the 
Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1317–18 (2003); Frank B. Cross, 
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 851 
(1996). 
101. See David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment & Other 
Contested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 79 (2004) [hereinafter Cassuto, The Law of 
Words] (“As the [social] system adapts, it gains complexity, enabling it to better cope 
with future perturbations. A static environment/system relationship would mean that 
communication as well as systemic evolution would stagnate. Stability depends on the 
system’s ability to reproduce and function both despite and because of ongoing 
environmental disturbance.”). 
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The international legal framework for groundwater is constantly 
evolving. In general, international laws regarding groundwater build on 
existing rules for surface water. They include the 1966 Helsinki Rules on 
the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,
102
 which were adopted by 
the International Law Association and laid out foundational principles 
for transboundary water issues.
103
 This agreement was followed by the 
1997 United Nations Convention on Nonnavigational Uses of 
Watercourses,
104




International groundwater law also encompasses the 1986 Seoul 
Rules on International Groundwaters
106
 and the 1994 United Nations 
International Law Commission Resolution on Confined Transboundary 
Groundwater.
107
 Further, in 2008, the United Nations General Assembly 




International agreements specifically dealing with the Guarani 
Aquifer include the 1969 Treaty on the La Plata Basin.
109
 This treaty 
provides the foundation upon which the Guarani Aquifer Environmental 
Protection and Sustainable Development Project
110
 was construed. All 






                                                          
102. Int’l Law Assoc., Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki, Finland, Helsinki Rules 
on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers (1966). 
103. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2220–21. 
104. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997). 
105. The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, Aug. 21, 2004, 71 I.L.A. 337, 385 
(2004). 
106. Int’l Law Assoc., Sixty-Second Conference, Seoul, S. Korea, Seoul Rules on 
International Groundwaters (1986). 
107. U.N. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 46th Sess., May 2–July 22, 1994, U.N. 
Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 135 (1994). 
108. G.A. Res. 63/124, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/124 (Jan. 15, 2009). 
109. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2228–31.  
110. ORG. OF AM. STATES OFFICE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & ENV’T, GUARANI 
AQUIFER SYSTEM (Oct. 2005), available at 
http://www.oas.org/dsd/Events/english/Documents/OSDE_7Guarani.pdf. 
111. Acordo, supra note 5 (citing the Treaty of La Plata River Basin and the 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development Project as consideration for the 
agreement).  
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A. Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer (Acordo) 
The Acordo outlines basic principles adopted by the four signatory 
countries and, if ratified, will represent a step forward for the aquifer’s 
multilateral management while still respecting domestic autonomy. It 
adopts many of the principles enumerated in the United Nations 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers.
112
 Even as it emphasizes national 
sovereignty,
113
 the Acordo also obliges signatories to manage the aquifer 
in accordance with governing principles of international law.
114
 This 
includes the obligation to not cause harm to another party or to the 
environment.
115
 It also imposes multilateral obligations, including 
protecting and conserving the aquifer in a manner ensuring multiple, 
rational, sustainable, and equitable uses.
116
  
Though imperfect, the Acordo represents a significant achievement 
in the field of international water law. To date, only a handful of 
international groundwater management agreements exist despite the 
existence of at least 270 transboundary aquifers, which provide water to 
millions of people.
117
 Because the Guarani, like all transboundary water 
resources, falls under multiple national jurisdictions and because the 
policies of the respective nations concerning overdraft and pollution 
impact the rest of the aquifer, the management strategies of the four 
countries overlying the GAS must be harmonized in order to function 
effectively. That strategy can derive from principles of reasonable and 
equitable use
118
 for allocation policies, as well as principles of no 
                                                          
112. Draft Articles, supra note 3 (precepts embraced by the Acordo include: no 
significant harm, sovereignty of the aquifer state, cooperation, and the regular exchange 
of information); see also Bryan A. Green, The Guarani Aquifer & International 
Groundwater Law: Advancing Towards a Legal Framework for the Management of a 
Transboundary Aquifer, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 361, 384–85 (2010). 
113. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 2; see also Draft Articles, supra note 3, art. 3 
(declaring that each overlying state has sovereignty over the part of the portion of the 
transboundary aquifer located in its territory). 
114. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 2. 
115. Id. art. 3.  
116. Id. art. 4. It is worth noting that the aforementioned objectives are aligned with 
the ones found in the 1997 Brazilian National Water Management Policy Act. See 
National Water Management Policy Act, Lei No. 9.433, art. 1, de 8 janeiro de 1997, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 09.01.1997 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.oas.org/usde/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/Brazil-
Law_No._9,433_(1997).pdf.  
117. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2211–12. 
118. Acordo, supra note 5, arts. 3–4. 
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significant harm for issues arising from contamination.
119
 Even as the 
Acordo recognizes these key precepts, its enforcement mechanisms 
remain underdeveloped. This lack of a shared approach to enforcement is 
understandable in light of the different national interests involved. 
However, its absence could hinder future efforts to manage the resource 
multilaterally.  
The Acordo adopts a number of important procedural principles. 
For example, the four nations agree to share information as well as to 
inform their fellow signatories of any domestic initiatives that may cause 
transboundary impact.
120
 Furthermore, Article 4 acknowledges the 
importance of protecting and conserving the aquifer as well as the need 
to identify areas requiring special attention, especially those near the 
borders.
121
 Nonetheless, as is often the case in multiparty agreements, the 




Similarly, Article 15, which creates a multilateral commission to 
oversee and manage cooperation between the parties, does not set out 
any specific duties or authority for the Commission. Instead, it states that 
the Commission will propound its operating regulations at a later date. 
This leaves the nascent Commission without a clear mandate or the 
means to enforce it. That mandate is urgently needed to provide the 
means to resolve the complex dilemmas that accompany the management 
of interstate and international transboundary groundwater resources.  
However, the threshold question that must precede any other 
managerial guidance involves determining the correct methodology for 
equitably allocating the aquifer’s waters. While the sheer size of the 
Guarani could lead one to presume that allocation is not the most urgent 
managerial issue, that premise is flawed for several reasons.  
First, until the waters are allocated, it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to codify the principles of sovereignty that the Acordo 
                                                          
119. Id. arts. 3, 6–7. 
120. Id. arts. 8–9. This approach is congruent with existing international law, as 
articulated in The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Rio 
Declaration of 1992 (“States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant 
information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse 
transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those states at an early stage 
and in good faith.”). See also Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a 
Proposal for an Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 49, 74 (2008). 
121. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 4. 
122. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2197. 
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purports to embrace.
123
 Since sovereignty over transboundary resources 
is problematic by definition, if the overlying nations do not have the 
means through which to quantify their control over the resource, 
irresolvable conflicts become inevitable. Furthermore, the exogenous 
factors discussed above will likely destabilize cooperation and generate 
disagreement. The overlying nations could avoid much of that 
disharmony by equitably allocating the water and creating the means 
through which to adjudicate disputes arising from current and future use 
pressures.  
Concerns over the nature and scope of the sovereignty guaranteed to 
the signatory nations in Article 2 are already the subject of vigorous 
debate.
124
 Indeed, some argue that the mere fact that such language exists 
within a modern transboundary water agreement reflects the enormous 
difficulty that continues to bedevil international ground and surface 
water management.
125
 This debate over the extent and understanding of 
sovereignty is likely to remain unresolved for the foreseeable future. In 
the interim, a practical solution would involve recognizing that states can 
and must collaborate based on a shared vision of existing principles of 
domestic and international environmental laws, as well as instrumental 
principles of equitable apportionment. The following two Subparts 
elaborate on the grounds (1) for the application of existing principles of 
domestic and international environmental laws and (2) for a more 
specific management guideline that incorporates the equitable 
apportionment doctrine, which, in turn, also serves to guide adjudication 
processes.  
 
                                                          
123. See Acordo, supra note 5. The Acordo notes the principles of sovereignty 
expressed in Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
and Resolution 1803 (XVII). United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973); Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 
15, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 15 (1962). 
124. See McCaffrey, supra note 6; see also Owen McIntyre, Fragmentation in 
International Water Resources Law: Reconciling the International Law Commission´s 
2008 Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers with the 1997 U.N. Watercourses 
Convention, at 2, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISARM2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: 
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS: CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Dec. 6–8, 2010). 
125. Gabriel Eckstein, Hydraulic Harmony or Water Whimsy? Guarani Aquifer 
Countries Sign Agreement, INT’L WATER L. PROJECT BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010, 11:08 PM), 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2010/08/05/hydraulic-harmony-or-water-
whimsy-guarani-aquifer-countries-sign-agreement/. 
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B. Managing for Uncertainty Under the Current Legal 
Regime 
1. Using Existing Laws to Manage for Uncertainty 
International laws and agreements regarding the GAS offer some 
guidelines through which the involved countries can assess and manage 
the myriad eco-systemic and political variables presented by such a vast 
and multifarious resource. Inventorying uncertainties is a necessary 
precondition to providing for the needs of the overlying countries.
126
 It is 
also a requirement for a second important initiative: reducing asymmetric 
information. That reduction in asymmetry requires qualified public 
participation at all levels of policymaking.  
Nevertheless, cooperation without clearly codified guidelines 
cannot resolve contentious disputes between sovereign nations. As 
exogenous and endogenous events create and compound uncertainties 
(both hard and soft), signatory nations will face pressures that are both as 
old as human civilization and as new as current events. For example, 
development pressures and conservation goals offer fertile ground for 
conflicting interests within the overlying countries. These conflicts can 
lead to a tragedy of the commons (at both the domestic and transnational 
levels) if not properly managed.
127
  
On the other hand, overregulation can diminish efficiency and 
impair development. Optimizing regulation presents an ongoing 
challenge, but the obstacles grow larger when the commons is as 
complex as the GAS. The complexity and environmental importance of 
the region, as well as the looming threats presented by climate change, 
make the need for accurate and detailed scientific and technical 
information urgent and crucial.
128
 Yet, relying on such information to 
manage such a complex natural resource creates risks as well.
129
  
                                                          
126. See Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment (Univ. of 
Chicago, Olin Law & Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 227.5). 
127. See generally Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) 
(The phenomenon of tragedy of the commons was first described in 1968 by Garrett 
Hardin. The dilemma occurs when multiple individuals, sharing the same resource act in 
their own self-interest in using the resource causing the resource to become depleted from 
overuse.).  
128. See Hall et al., supra note 93. 
129. See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 
(Mark Ritter trans., 1986). 
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Environmental uncertainty can never be eliminated; at best, it can 
be quantified and reduced.
130
 Too often, however, the role of uncertainty 
in risk assessment and in legal and managerial decisions gets reduced or 
ignored.
131
 Understanding the role of uncertainty and how to best manage 
it is necessary to achieve a stable regulatory framework—not just for the 
Guarani region, but for all transboundary water regimes.  
2. Reducing Asymmetric Information 
Shared information is an often overlooked management tool. 
Decreasing uncertainty requires reducing asymmetric information. This 
will require policy makers to bridge the gaps among scientists coming 
from different areas of knowledge as a first attempt to mitigate the 
impacts of the socioeconomic burdens born by the regulated sectors.
132
 
Local and traditional knowledge, particularly for a resource as vast as the 
GAS, must also be considered. Capacity building is crucial. Users must 
have access to state of the art scientific information written in language 
accessible to nonspecialists. The less asymmetric the information, the 
lower the degree of uncertainty, and consequently, the more likely the 
regulatory decision will be beneficial.
133
 In this context, beneficial means 
both more legitimate and more procedurally efficient, taking into account 
the competing uses and needs of different regions within Brazil and 
within the four overlying nations.
134
 
With regard to the GAS, recent developments reveal a laudable 
collaboration aimed at reducing asymmetric information at all levels: 
international, regional, and local. However, public participation must 
also play a key role. Vital information resides within traditional and local 
knowledge.
135
 Another crucial component of a successful multilateral 
management strategy (including both multistate and multinational 
resource management) lies in coordinating actions and plans.  
For known unknowns that create endogenous challenges, cost-
benefit analysis (accounting for externalities as well as noneconomic 
factors) can serve a useful function at all levels, from international to 
                                                          
130. See generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV 495 (1986).  
131. Wildavsky, supra note 23.  
132. See generally James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 781 (1990). 
133. Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer, Evaluating Public-Participation Exercises: A 
Research Agenda, 29 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 512, 520 (2004). 
134. See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, INCENTIVES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
(2000). 
135. Benjamín & Marques, supra note 40, at 2232–42. 
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local. For exogenous threats, a precautionary approach, tempered by 
pragmatism and relying heavily on public participation, should govern.
136
 
Incorporating the precautionary principle requires understanding and 
managing for the catastrophic potential of low probability events with 
high impacts. This involves constructing mitigation policies that navigate 
dangers presented by unknown and unpredictable events, while 




Incorporating these management tools into the Acordo 
Commission’s mandate will require some tough sledding, but is 
necessary to the enactment of balanced, responsive policies. In sum, the 
Commission’s mandate must include a transparent and timely procedure 
to convey scientific information to the general public, enable public 
participation within the decision-making process, and enable rapid 
response to environmental and societal shifts. It must also include an 
effective method for allocating managerial responsibility and enabling 
dispute resolution among the four nations. Those latter requirements can 
best be accomplished through a procedure based on principles articulated 




                                                          
136. Article 12 of the Draft Articles requires that states overlying transboundary 
aquifers “take a precautionary approach in view of the uncertainty about the nature and 
extent of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system and of its vulnerability to pollution.” 
Draft Articles, supra note 3, art. 12; Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 3, at 222. However, 
Article 12 is concerned solely with pollution, not with general management practices. 
Furthermore, as Professor McCaffrey notes, the precautionary principle is generally 
relevant to situations where there is scientific uncertainty while there is “[l]ittle . . . 
uncertainty . . . about the harm pollution would cause to an aquifer.” He goes on to argue 
that it would have been more appropriate for Article 12 to have “enjoined states to 
exercise a high degree of caution, perhaps even to take precautionary measures, so as to 
prevent pollution of shared aquifers, rather than to have invoked a principle or approach 
designed to deal with uncertainty.” Stephen C. McCaffrey, The International Law 
Commission Adopts Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 272, 
278 (2009). 
137. See generally Thomas C. Schelling, Some Economics of Global Warming, 82 
AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1992). 
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V. INCORPORATING THE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT 
DOCTRINE INTO THE ACORDO AND CREATING A 
SOUND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR THE GAS 
International groundwater law has already moved towards 
incorporating principles of equitable apportionment into what the ILC 
Draft Articles call “equitable and reasonable utilization.”138 However, as 
the name implies, both it and the U.S. doctrine of equitable 
apportionment are primarily concerned with allocating water rights 
among interested parties.
139
 The focus of this Part is more on managerial 
authority and dispute resolution. In order to contextualize the 
international legal guidelines as well as our recommendations for the 
GAS, it is instructive to briefly review the U.S. doctrine of equitable 
apportionment.  
A. The Equitable Apportionment Doctrine 
“Equitable apportionment” is used in U.S. law to allocate surface 
water between quasi-sovereign states and thereby adjudicate interstate 
disputes. It is well-suited to adjudicate transboundary groundwater 
disputes as well. The American system of federalism among quasi-
sovereign states resembles, in many key respects, the relations between 
sovereign nations. As Justice Holmes wrote in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper in 1907, a state “has an interest . . . in all the earth and air within 
its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be 
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”140 In 
1982, the Court expanded its discussion of the sovereignty of states, 
noting that they possess at least two relevant sovereign interests: “First . . 
. the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal; 
second, the demand for recognition from other sovereigns—most 
frequently this involves the maintenance and recognition of borders.”141 
                                                          
138. As Professor McCaffrey notes, the doctrine was first introduced into 
international water law in the International Law Association’s 1966 Helsinki Rules and 
was embraced by the International Court of Justice in its 1997 decision in the Case 
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). STEPHEN C. 
MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 384–85 (2d ed. 2007). 
139. Id. 
140. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
141. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 
(1982). The quasi-sovereign nature of states and their consequent right to seek judicial 
redress for damage to their territory also played a pivotal role in Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007). 
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This similarity between the right of U.S. states to seek domestic redress 
for sovereignty violations and the right of sovereign nations to do 
likewise in international disputes is already recognized by international 
law outside of the water law context.
142
 For example, the Trail Smelter 
adjudication of the dispute between the United States and Canada 
acknowledged the responsibility of sovereign states for transboundary 
pollution while also recognizing the value and applicability of U.S. 




In U.S. jurisprudence, equitable apportionment guides the U.S. 
Supreme Court when exercising its original jurisdiction over interstate 
disputes over surface water allocation. In other words, when there exists 
a conflict between two states with differing laws, the Supreme Court 
resolves the dispute by applying equitable principles tailored to 
adjudicate interstate water disputes. The Court’s involvement in 
interstate water allocation is more than a century old, and its foundational 
principles have evolved over time. In Kansas v. Colorado, a 1907 case, 
the Court rejected Colorado’s claim that the principles of sovereignty 
gave Colorado the right to appropriate the entire flow of the Arkansas 
River.
144
 The Court held that “[e]quality of right” is the governing 
principle for resolving interstate water disputes
145
 and that states stand on 




In 1983, in Idaho v. Oregon,
147
 the Court articulated a set of applied 
guidelines for its interstate water jurisprudence: 
 States may not preserve the natural resources within their 
borders solely for their own inhabitants. 
                                                          
142. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 138, at 386–99 (describing equitable 
apportionment and its analogues in international water law). 
143.  See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1907, 1965 (1941); see also 
Cassuto, The Law of Words, supra note 101, at 109 (“In effect, the decision introduced 
the Roman concept of sic utere ut alienum non laedas (one should use one’s own 
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another) to modern international 
environmental law.”); Brian R. Popiel, Comment, From Customary Law to 
Environmental Impact Assessment: A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary 
Environmental Damage Between Canada and the United States, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 447, 451 (1995); Martin D. Gelfand, Note, Practical Application of International 
Environmental Law: Does It Work Atoll? 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 73, 77 (1997). 
144. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97–98 (1907). 
145. Id. at 97. 
146. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922). 
147. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1020–27 (1983). 
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 No state has inherent priority over another state with respect to 
the waters of interstate streams. 
 For its claim to interstate water to have any chance at success, 
the complaining state must show that it took affirmative steps to 
conserve water as well as to augment supply.
148
 
It bears noting that, in addition to the above principles, the Court set 
a high bar for those states claiming injury over allocations of an interstate 
water body.
149
 The complaining state must show substantial injury to its 
interests as a result of the actions of the defendant state.
150
 Furthermore, 
the evidentiary standard for proving that injury is “clear and convincing 
evidence.”151 Both the substantial injury bar and the clear and convincing 
evidence threshold make it likely that states will exhaust all other options 
available before resorting to a court challenge. 
When interstate disputes do land before the Supreme Court, in 
addition to the guidelines described above, the Court applies a mix of 
fundamental principles of equity and basic rules of water management 
without “quibbling over formulas.”152 As articulated in Nebraska v. 
Wyoming,
153
 those principles include (but are not limited to) considering 
the: 
 Physical and climatic conditions 
 Rates and patterns of consumption 
 Existing rights under state law 
 Nature and rate of return flows 
 Effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas 
 Extent and economics of existing uses 
 Damage to upstream areas as compared to benefits to 
downstream areas if upstream uses are restricted 
The foregoing guidelines offer a broad framework for dispute 
resolution while allowing the Court to integrate whatever other factors it 
deems useful in any given situation. In other words, as J.B. Ruhl points 
                                                          
148. See J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water 
Law for a New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 47, 50–51 (2003). 
149. Idaho, 462 U.S. at 1027. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931). 
153. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945). 
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out, “equitable apportionment encompasses whatever seems relevant to a 
fair division of the resource between the states.”154 This flexibility means 
that it can incorporate new developments in hydrology or ecology and 
new information about demands and uses and also adapt to situations 
requiring new or revised principles of law. 
The applicability of this regime to international interstate disputes 
seems clear. As an initial matter, it makes the bar for demonstrating 
injury sufficiently high so as to discourage litigation and encourage 
multiple uses. It also places a considerable evidentiary burden on 
complaining states (the clear and convincing evidence standard) to 
support the injury claimed. This high evidentiary bar will demand 
extensive due diligence and thereby encourage alternative dispute 
resolution. Both of these approaches would work well in an international 
context.  
With respect to the GAS, the size and hydrological variations in the 
aquifer mean that different states (and the various regions within the 
different states) will necessarily have different use patterns. Those 
varying uses will impact the aquifer in differing ways. Consequently, any 
dispute resolution approach must be flexible and adaptable to these 
regional variations, similar to the flexibility that is required to respond to 
exogenous and endogenous managerial challenges.
155
 Because it arose to 
address just such situations, equitable apportionment is highly adaptable 
to such circumstances. The doctrine offers broad guidelines based on 
equity and existing legal doctrines in the respective states while allowing 
consideration of other relevant factors. No one set of legal principles is 
dispositive, although all are instructive. Equitable apportionment also 
allows for uncertainty (e.g. variations in climatic conditions, changes in 
flows and use patterns, etc.) to play a role in dispute resolution practices. 
B. A Viable Dispute Resolution Mechanism: The ICJ is 
the Proper Site for Adjudicating Disputes in the GAS 
In addition to a well-articulated dispute resolution process whose 
authority all parties recognize, the process must be implemented by a 
body that commands the respect and allegiance of all the parties, and its 
decisions must have the force of binding international law. Based on its 
                                                          
154. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 52. 
155. See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text. 
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track record of effectively adjudicating transboundary disputes,
156
 ICJ 
seems the appropriate forum for settling disputes over the GAS.  
In order for ICJ jurisdiction to occur, the ICJ’s charter requires that 
its jurisdiction be spelled out in the agreement between nations. 
Consequently, for the ICJ to have jurisdiction over the signatories to the 
Acordo, that jurisdiction must be actually inserted into the agreement. 
The ICJ has already articulated the need for environmental impact 
assessments as a requirement for actions with the potential for significant 
transboundary impact.
157
 The equitable apportionment principles 
articulated by the Acordo Commission should meld nicely with those 
existing principles to guide the ICJ’s adjudication of disputes over 
allocation. One of the principal benefits of the equitable apportionment 
allocation and dispute resolution methodology proposed here is that it 
can operate in the absence of a resolution to the contentious issue of 
sovereignty over transboundary resources. In this sense alone, it is a 
significant improvement over the current language of the agreement. 
The existing framework is inadequate because it lacks both a 
philosophical and methodological heuristic for mediating disagreements 
between the sovereign nations that overlie the resource. Simple calls for 
cooperation cannot suffice because of the competing allegiances of the 
disputants. Furthermore, limiting the Acordo Commission’s mandate to 
simply issuing a recommendation for resolving a multilateral 
disagreement is also insufficient.
158
 The irresolvable nature of such 
disputes leads to overly rigid readings of the sovereignty principle,
159
 as 
well as overly hopeful expectations of multilateral cooperation.
160
 By 
contrast, when applied judiciously in the proper forum, equitable 
apportionment principles successfully negotiate a middle ground 
between these two unworkable options. 
 
                                                          
156. See generally Dr. Jorge E. Vinuales, The Contribution of the International 
Court of Justice to the Development of International Law: A Contemporary Assessment, 
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 232 (2008). 
157. The court noted that it is “a requirement under general international law to 
undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed 
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in 
particular, on a shared resource. . . .” Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 
2010 I.C.J. 14, 83 (April 20). 
158. Acordo, supra note 5, art. 17.  
159. See McCaffrey, supra note 6, at 289 (discussing the ill-conceived and poorly 
received Harmon Doctrine of the United States). 
160. See generally id. (laying out the flaws in the ILC Draft Articles).  
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C. Proposed Amendments to the Acordo 
Given the foregoing, we propose several clauses for adoption into 
the Acordo. The first is an amendment to Article 16, the second is an 
amendment to Article 17, and the last is an additional paragraph to 
Article 17. This additional paragraph to Article 17 is inspired by the 
Judicial Settlement of Dispute Clause in the 1975 Statute of the River 
Uruguay between Uruguay and Argentina. That clause forms the source 
of the ICJ jurisdiction in the recent case between the two countries 
regarding pulp mills on the Uruguay River. The proposed clauses are as 
follows: 
We propose the following language for Article 16:  
Direct negotiations among the Parties over the interpretation of the 
application of the Acordo must take into account existing general 
principles of international water law, and the rules derived from the 
equitable apportionment doctrine set forth in Article ___ herein. 
When called upon to draft recommendations over disputes 
concerning the interpretation of application of the Acordo, the 
Commission must be bound by existing general principles of 
international water law, and by the rules derived from the equitable 
apportionment doctrine set forth in Article ___ herein. 
We propose the following amendment to Article 17: 
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Acordo which cannot be settled by direct negotiations or via 
recommendations issued by the Commission may be submitted by 
any the Parties to the International Court of Justice [or the Arbitral 
Tribunal]. 
We propose an additional paragraph to Article 17, with the 
following language: 
In hearing cases arising from the dispute resolution clause, the ICJ 
[or the Arbitral Tribunal] should be bound by generally accepted 
principles of international law, as well as by the principles of 
equitable apportionment highlighted (but not limited to those) below: 
 Physical and climatic conditions 
 Rates and patterns of consumption 
 Existing rights under national laws 
 Nature and rate of return flows 
 Effect of wasteful uses and their transboundary impacts of the 
GAS 
 Extent and the social and economic aspects of existing uses 
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 Damage to one (or more) neighboring countries as compared to 
benefits to one (or more) neighboring countries if the prior uses are 
restricted 
It bears noting that adjudication before the ICJ or an Arbitral 
Tribunal would only become an option after exhausting the mandatory 
mediation processes imposing direct negotiation and then 
recommendations issued by the Acordo Commission. In both cases, the 
mediation procedure would be guided by existing principles of 
international and domestic law regarding groundwater, and more 
substantively, by the rules derived from an adapted equitable 
apportionment doctrine. If mediation cannot resolve a given dispute, the 
adjudication clause would then apply. The adjudication clause institutes 
ICJ’s jurisdiction.161  
A second best approach presupposes that the arbitral clause in 
Article 19 of the Acordo remains unchanged. The second part then 
creates the framework through which to implement equitable 
apportionment of the GAS via the mandate for the ICJ or to the 
Commission as is currently articulated in Article 15 of the Acordo. This 
approach would indicate a set of rules accepted by the parties that would 
guide the ICJ’s ruling in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of the 
                                                          
161. Annex to U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2012) (“1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties 
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in 
treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any 
time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, 
in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in 
all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of 
international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a 
breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made 
for the breach of an international obligation. 3. The declarations referred to above may be 
made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
states, or for a certain time. 4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the 
Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall 
be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they 
still have to run and in accordance with their terms. 6. In the event of a dispute as to 
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the 
Court.”). 
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ICJ.
162
 The same authority allows for the formation of an Arbitral 
Tribunal.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the legal framework for the Guarani represents progress but 
also highlights the challenges and risks ahead. Brazil’s constitutional 
predicament with respect to transboundary groundwater, as well as other 
domestic legal hurdles, complicates an already difficult multilateral 
management process. Overcoming these challenges and effectively 
managing the Guarani will require both domestic legal reform, as well as 
increased attention to hard and soft uncertainty questions. Once 
categorized, policy makers must allow for public participation through 
the promotion of awareness, capacity building, community involvement, 
and traditional knowledge. In addition, the regulatory framework must 
acknowledge the unitary nature of the aquifer while still remaining 
sensitive to differing national and local priorities. This challenge, faced 
by every transnational water negotiation, looms particularly large with 
the GAS because of the size and importance of the resource and because 
of its impact on other sensitive and protected regions.  
The Acordo is a strong beginning to the creation of a multilateral 
management regime, but it cannot yet function effectively. Significant 
changes in both the domestic hydro-legal regimes of the overlying 
countries remain necessary, as is the emendation of the Acordo itself. 
While this Article confines itself to the domestic groundwater regime of 
Brazil, similar attention must be paid to the regimes of Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay. Nevertheless, given Brazil’s size and dominance 
of the aquifer region, if and when it harmonizes its groundwater laws and 
brings transboundary groundwater under federal jurisdiction, that 
concordance will constitute a significant step toward effective 
multilateral management. 
Finally, the Acordo itself must be strengthened to include a mandate 
for the Commission it creates, and to create an effective dispute 
                                                          
162. Id. art. 38 (“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
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resolution process. We have proposed a process that draws on existing 
principles of international groundwater law (equitable and reasonable 
utilization) while hearkening back more strongly to the predicates of that 
doctrine, which lie within the principle of equitable apportionment. We 
argue that the Acordo should be amended to create jurisdiction for the 
ICJ over multilateral disputes in the GAS and that those disputes be 
resolved according to principles laid out in the jurisprudence of equitable 
apportionment.  
Justice Holmes wrote that “a river is more than an amenity, [sic] it 
is a treasure.”163 The same is true—perhaps even truer—of the Guarani 
Aquifer. The proposals offered here represent part of an ongoing process 
to safeguard this treasure against the pressures and challenges of a 
changing world and climate while allowing its sustainable use in 
perpetuity. There are uncertain days ahead for the GAS and for the four 
countries that manage it. But uncertainty has always been with us and 
will never disappear. The goal is not to eradicate uncertainty but rather to 
formulate an effective strategy for managing it. 
                                                          
163. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931). 
